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INTRODUCTION
Today, I wish to introduce you to the European Court of Human
Rights. I shall first offer some remarks about the history of the Court,
the changing perceptions, the underlying theories, and the way the
Court has shaped European reality. Then I shall discuss a few recent
cases as specific illustrations of the Court's work. Towards the end, I
shall add a few remarks about the difficult relationship between
terrorism and human rights.

I. PAST
We began the 20th century with an international law that viewed
only sovereign States as actors, unbridled and uncontrolled, entitled
to go to war, and also entitled to treat citizens and foreigners alike as
* This piece is based on remarks given by President Wildhaber at the American
University Washington College of Law on April 21, 2006.
** Mr. Luzius Wildhaber, President of the European Court of Human Rights
1997-2007, Doctor of Law, Basel, 1961; LL.M. Yale, 1965; J.S.D., Yale, 1968;
Dres.h.c., LL.D.h.c.
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objects, whose legal status and whose human rights were defined
solely by national law. We end the 20th and begin the 21st century
with individuals who have become subjects of international law and
a European Court of Human Rights which is the most spectacular
illustration of this change in paradigms.1 In the same vein, modern
sovereignty should be understood as requiring respect for, rather than
the breach of human rights, minority rights, democracy, and the rule
of law.
One of the founding fathers of the European Convention on
Human Rights, the Frenchman Pierre-Henri Teitgen, explained this
in 1949 in moving words. He spoke about the time when he was in
the Gestapo prisons while one of his brothers was at Dachau and one
of his brothers-in-law was dying at Mauthausen. 2 He said: "I think
we can now.., confront 'reasons of State' with the only sovereignty
worth dying for, worthy in all circumstances of being defended,
respected and safeguarded-the sovereignty ofjustice and of law." 3
Let us look even farther back into history. Already in ancient and
medieval times, European political theories endeavoured to moderate
the power of the rulers and to realise justice. Bracton demanded in
1250 the rule of law and the restriction of the unbridled State and the
King. Even the King, he said, was subject to God and the law,
because only the law made him King (quia lex facit regem). For
there was no King, where arbitrariness and not the law ruled.4
Let me now bring you back to the year of 1950 and the signing
ceremony of the European Convention on Human Rights in Rome.5
A small group of far-sighted, idealistic lawyers, determined to
1. See Luzius Wildhaber, Sovereignty and International Law, in THE
STRUCTURE

AND

PROCESS

OF

INTERNATIONAL

PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY

LAW:

ESSAYS

IN

LEGAL

425, 438 (R. St. J. Macdonald & Douglas M.

Johnston eds., 1983) (describing the evolution of international law from that
dealing with relations between states to law relating to a wide range of issues,
including human rights).
2. 1 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE "TRAVAUX PRtPARATOIRES" 48-50 (1975).
3. Id. at 50.
4. See 2 BRACTON (HENRY OF BRATTON), DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS
ANGLIAE 33 (G.E. Woodbine & S.E. Thome eds., Cambridge/Massachusetts

1968), cited by Luzius WILDHABER, MENSCHEN- UND MINDERHEITENRECHTE IN
DER MODERNEN DEMOKRATIE 4 (1992).
5. COLLECTED EDITION OF THE "TRAVAUX PRtPARATOIRES," supra note 2, at
XXII.
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prevent the recurrence of the devastation of war and the attendant
horrendous crimes, argued that the best way to achieve that end was
to guarantee respect for democracy and the rule of law at the national
level. They believed that only by the collective enforcement of
fundamental rights was it possible to secure the common minimum
standards that form the basis of democratic society. It was Churchill
himself who had referred first to a "European Court before which the
violation of [human] rights ...might be brought to the judgment of

the civilised world."6 Lord Layton, a member of the British
delegation, saw the Convention as "a means of strengthening the
resistance in all our countries against insidious attempts to
undermine our democratic way of life, and thus to give to Western
Europe as a whole a greater political stability."7 For the first time
individuals could challenge the actions of Governments before an
international mechanism under a procedure leading to a binding
judicial decision. The mandate which the founders of the Convention
intended to entrust to the Court was eminently, even surprisingly,
political.' The Court was to constitute a collective insurance policy
against the relapse of democracies into dictatorships. What is
nowadays identified as the hallmark of the Court, i.e. a generalised
right of individual application for all sorts of possible victims, does
not figure prominently in the original discussions on the Convention.

II. PRESENT
Now we move fifty years ahead, to 1998, when the Convention
system underwent a major reform. 9 The original institutions, the
European Court and the Commission of Human Rights, were
replaced by a single Court functioning on a full-time basis.10 The
optional elements of the earlier system, the right to individual
petition and the acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction, were

6. Id. at 34.
7. Id.at 30.
8. See id. (describing the Convention's goal of upholding democracy by
preventing the destruction of democracy by dictatorships).
9. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, HISTORICAL BACKGROUND,
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/The+Court/History+of+the
+Court/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
10. See id.
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eliminated; so was the Committee of Ministers' adjudicative role."
The Convention process, directly accessible to individuals, became
fully judicial in character. The two initial bodies, the Commission
from 1954 and the Court from 1959, gave life to the Convention,
through their pioneering case-law.' 2 Their purposive, autonomous,
and at times creative interpretation of the Convention enhanced the
rights protected to ensure that they had practical effect. Just to take
one example, the right of access to a court, a right that lies at the
heart of the Convention and a key element of the rule of law, was not
expressly mentioned in the due process provision, Article 6, Section
1.13 The Court's observation was of beautiful simplicity: "[t]he fair,
public and expeditious characteristics of judicial proceedings are of
no value at all if there are no judicial proceedings. 14 To this the
Court later added that the right of access "would be illusory if a
Contracting State's domestic legal system allowed a final, binding
judicial decision to remain inoperative to the detriment of one
party." 5 On the basis of such case-law, the Court established the
principle that the Convention is to be interpreted as a living
instrument, to be construed in the light of present day conditions.
Let me add a few personal remarks on the doctrine of the
Convention as a living instrument. Our Court has of course followed
precedent, except where cogent reasons impelled it to adjust the
interpretation of the Convention to changes in societal values or in
present-day conditions. And it has followed precedent not only with
respect to judgments against a respondent State, but it recognises that
the same European minimal standards should be observed in all
member States. It is indeed in the interests of legal certainty, of a
coherent development of the Convention case-law, of equality before

11. See id.
12. See id. (explaining the respective roles of the Commission, which made
initial determinations on the admissibility of applications, and the Court, which
could issue binding judgments).
13. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter European
Convention on Human Rights] (establishing the right to a "fair and public
hearing").
14. Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1, 17-18 (1975).
15. Hornsby v. Greece, 1997-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 495, 510.
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the law, of the rule of law, and of the separation of powers for the
Court to follow in principle a moderated doctrine of precedent. 16
Obviously in describing the Court's tasks in this way, I espouse a
certain image of what the role of a European quasi-constitutional
Judge should be. Our Court is to a certain extent a law-making body.
How could it be otherwise? How is it possible to give shape to
Convention guarantees such as the prohibition of torture, equality of
arms, freedom of expression or private and family life, if-like
Montesquieu-you see in the judge only the mouthpiece of the law?
Such guarantees are programmatic formulations, open to the future,
to be unfolded and developed in the light of changing conditions. My
personal philosophy of the task of judges is that they should find
their way gradually, in a way experimentally, inspired by the facts of
the cases that reach a court. As you will realise, I do not believe in
closed theoretical systems that are presented as sacrosanct on the
basis of speculative hypotheses or ideologies. Such mono-causal
explanations ignore the complex and often contradictory manner in
which societies and international relations (and incidentally also
individual human beings) evolve. Conversely, it has to be
acknowledged that in developing the law it is difficult to avoid value
judgments, whether on domestic or on international law. This applies
especially to human rights, which, anchored as they are in the
concepts of constitutionalism, democracy and the rule of law, are
value judgments par excellence.
I might emphasise that I do not plead for a "Gouvernement des
Juges."' 17 Giving broad answers which are in no way called for by the
facts of a case is to confuse a judicial mandate with that of the
legislature or of the executive, and cannot and should not be the role
of courts. In the famous "Federalist" Papers, Alexander Hamilton,
the great theoretician of the American Constitution, wrote that the

16. See Luzius Wildhaber, Precedent in the European Court of Human Rights,
in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 1529 (Paul
Mahoney, Franz Matscher, Herbert Petzold, Luzius Wildhaber eds., 2000).
17. See
Un
gouvemement
des
juges
est-il
d
craindre?,
http://www.oboulo.com/expose/gouvemment-juges-est-il-craindre.html
(last
visited Jan. 26, 2007) (describing that "Gouvernment des Juges" is a shift of power
to the judiciary to make arbitrary decisions at the expense of the balance of powers
found in modem day democratic governments; namely the Executive and
Legislative branches of government).
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government holds the sword, the legislature holds the money box,
and the only thing the courts hold for themselves is their
independence. 8 It is that independence which places us in a position
to watch over fairness and justice within governments.
Let me also add that whereas international human rights judges
should do what is fair and fear no one, as the puritans would have put
it, they should at the same time have regard for the context in which
they live and for the aims they are serving. Human rights are our
common responsibility. First and foremost they must be respected by
the national parliaments, governments, courts and civil society at
large. Only if they fail does our Court come in. The subsidiary aspect
I describe and advocate here is more than pragmatic realism; it is
also a way of paying respect to democratic processes (always
provided they are indeed democratic); and I am firmly convinced that
it is the best means of translating the "human rights-law-in-thebooks" not only into a "human rights-law-in-the-court", but into a
"human rights-law-in-action" and-hopefully-in reality in all of
our member States.
The full-time European Court of Human Rights which was set up
in 1998 under Protocol No. 11 to the European Convention on
Human Rights is the biggest international Court that has ever
existed. 19 It is composed of a number of judges equal to that of the
Contracting States.2" With the sole exception of Belarus, all
European States are today members of the Council of Europe and
have ratified the European Convention on Human Rights, whose
protection now stretches from Iceland to Turkey, from Lisbon to
Wladfiwostok, from Riga to Malta, but also from Chechnya to the

18. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 378 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed.,
2003) (asserting that of the three branches, the judiciary poses the least threat to
individual liberties).
19. See Protocol 11 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter
Protocol 11]; see also European Court of Human Rights - Description,
http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/PICTRes/2003/10.html (last visited Jan. 27,
2007) (recounting that over the years the ECHR has grown into the largest
international bench and into one of the biggest and most respected international
judicial bodies).
20. See Protocol 11, supra note 19, art. 20.
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Basque region, from Northern Ireland to Cyprus and NagornoKarabach.2 '
Whereas the official languages of the Court are English and
French, applications may be drafted in any one of the official
languages of the Contracting States, and there are at present 41
official languages in these States.
The Court receives around 900 letters per day and some 250
international telephone calls a day. Its internet site was visited by 57
million hits in 2005. From 1998 to 2003, the number of applications
has increased by about 15% in comparison with each preceding
year.22 In 2005, there was only an increase of 2%.23 We now have
some 81,000 pending applications before us.2 4 In the past two years,
we received some 45,000 applications. 25 The highest number of cases
have come from Russia, Poland, Turkey and Romania (the so-called
"big four"), which account for some 50% of all applications that
reach our Court. 6 Some 63% of all cases have in recent years come
from the 21 new member states of Central and Eastern Europe (at
present about 18% come from Russia), some 11% from Turkey and
only some 26% from the traditional Western European States.27
Future historians might well argue that one of the biggest
achievements of the Convention system was to be present and active
when the Iron Curtain fell in 1989, so that the new member states
had a whole body of case-law of which they could avail themselves.

21. See generally The Council of Europe's Member States,

http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/AboutCoe/Memberstates/default.asp

(last visited

Jan. 21, 2007).
22. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES 2005, at
33 available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/4753F3E8-3ADO-42C5-

B294-0F2A68507FC0/0/2005_SURVEYCOURT_.pdf [hereinafter SURVEY OF
2005].
23. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, STATISTICS 2005, available at
http://www.echr.coe.intVNR/rdonlyres/5211 CDBA-8208-47DE-A9CAACTIVITIES

AE8B8FD13872/0/stats2005.pdf (noting that 45,000 applications were filed in
2005, compared to 44,100 in 2004) [hereinafter STATISTIcS 2005].
24. See id. (reporting a 4% increase in pending applications from Jan. 1
through Dec. 31, 2005).
25. See id.
26. See

SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES

27. See id.

2005, supra note 22, at 35.
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All sorts of cases reach our Court. Issues of the Communist
nationalizations of property in Czechoslovakia, Slovakia and Eastern
Germany and the question of whether the Czech Republic after the
fall of the Iron Curtain could restrict the restitution of nationalized
goods to Czech nationals only were declared inadmissible. 28 Two
applicants elected to the parliament of San Marino refused to take the
required oath on the Holy Gospels and were disqualified from sitting
in the parliament, which our Court qualified as a violation of the
freedom of religion in the Buscarini case. 29 A French-Moroccan drug
trafficker held in custody was beaten up so severely by the police
that medical certificates listed about 40 visible injuries all over his
body, for which no plausible explanation was given, so our Court
had to decide in the Selmouni case that he had been tortured.3" The
Swiss Animal Protection Society wanted to run an ad on TV,
showing piglets and encouraging people to "eat less meat"; the TV
refused saying this was "political" speech, whereas, if people had
been invited to "eat more meat", this would have been "commercial"
speech and therefore permissible; our Court saw in this a violation of
the freedom of expression in the case of Vereinigung gegen
Tierfabriken.3 1 An imaginative applicant complained that the right to
marriage of Article 12 must mean that the State was under an
obligation to provide him with a suitable wife; unfortunately for him,
32
the applicant was turned down.
Functionally speaking, the European Court of Human Rights is
becoming a European quasi-Constitutional Court. It is less handling
the exceptional cases which captivated the attention of the founders
of the Convention, but is becoming more and more a broad-based,
"normal" institution, although a very symbolic one. Let me now
discuss a few recent cases as illustrations.

28. See generally Malhous v. Czech Republic, 2000-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 533;
Gratzinger & Gratzingerova v. Czech Republic, 2002-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 399;
Kopeck3' v. Slovakia, 2004-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 131.
29. Buscarini v. San Marino, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 605, 616.
30. Selmouni v. France, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 149, 183.
31. VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 243,
266.
32. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 13, art. 12.
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III. RECENT CASELAW
In a series of important judgments over the past few years, the
Court has sought to explain the implications the Convention has for
the political systems of the Contracting States and, in particular, the
notion that pluralist democracy is the only political system that is
compatible with the Convention. In an earlier judgment in 1998, in
the Turkish Communist Party case the Court had found that
democracy appeared to be the sole political model contemplated by
the Convention and, consequently, the only one that was compatible
with it.33 But this raised the question of what that concept meant.
It is here that the Court has a role to play in identifying the
constituent elements of democracy and in reminding us of the
minimum essential requirements of a political system where human
rights are respected. In the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) v. Turkey
judgment,3 4 it carried out a thorough examination of the relationship
between the Convention, democracy, political parties, and religion.
The case concerned the dissolution, by the Turkish Constitutional
Court, of a political party, the Welfare Party, on the grounds that it
wanted to introduce sharia law and a theocratic regime.3 5 A Grand
Chamber of the Court found unanimously that there had been no
violation of Article 11 of the Convention, which protects freedom of
association.3 6 The judgment provides some elements of an answer to
the question which we have raised today concerning the dimensions
of the New Europe.
The Court first noted that freedom of thought, religion, expression,
and association as guaranteed by the Convention could not deprive
the authorities of a State in which an association jeopardized that
State's institutions, of the right to protect those institutions.3 7 It
necessarily followed that a political party whose leaders incited to
violence, or put forward a policy which failed to respect democracy,
or which was aimed at the destruction of democracy and the flouting
33. United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 22.
34. Refah Partisi v. Turkey, 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 267, 300-03.
35. See id.at 269-70.
36. See id. at 316 (reasoning that Refah's dissolution, restricting the freedom of
assembly and association guaranteed in Article 11, was necessary to protect the
rights and freedoms of others).
37. Id. at 303.
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of the rights and freedoms recognised in a democracy, could not
invoke the protection of the Convention.38 Penalties imposed on
those grounds could even, where there was a "sufficiently established
and imminent" danger for democracy, take the form of preventive
intervention.39
The Court noted that the leaders of the Welfare Party had pledged
to set up a regime based on sharia law.40 It found that sharia, as
defined by the leaders of the Welfare Party, was incompatible with
the fundamental principles of democracy as set forth in the
Convention.41 It considered that "sharia, which faithfully reflects the
dogmas and divine rules laid down by religion, is stable and
invariable.42 Principles such as pluralism in the political sphere or the
43
constant evolution of public freedoms have no place in it."
According to the Court, it was difficult to declare one's respect for
democracy and human rights, while at the same time supporting a
regime based on such a sharia.44 Such a regime clearly diverged from
Convention values, particularly with regard to its criminal law and
criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of women, and the
way it intervened in all spheres of private and public life in
accordance with religious precepts.45
Next, let me describe the case of Ila~cu, Ivantoc, Le~co and
Petrov-Popa v. Moldova and Russia which concerned events that
occurred in the "Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria" ("MRT"),
the region of Moldova to the East of the river Dniester known as
Transdniestria. 46 This region declared its independence in 1991,
which in turn led to a civil war and to the self-proclamation of a
breakaway regime. This regime is not recognized by the international
community. The case concerned the unlawful detention of the four
applicants, following their arrest in 1992 and their subsequent trial
38. Id. at 303-04.
39. See id. at 305 (recognizing the possibility of a preventative intervention
where "the national courts, after detailed scrutiny subjected to rigorous European
supervision," identify an imminent danger).
40. Id. at310-11.
41. Id. at 312.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Ila~cu v. Moldova & Russia, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 179.
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by the so-called "Supreme Court of the MRT" and the ill-treatment,
inhuman prison conditions and torture inflicted on them during their
detention, as well as the death penalty imposed on Mr. Ila~cu and the
mock executions to which he was subjected.4 7
The European Court of Human Rights established the
responsibility of both respondent States (that of Moldova for the
period after 2001) and found a violation of Articles 3, 5 and 34 of the
Convention. 48 The Court ordered the immediate release of the
applicants still in detention.4 9 It emphasised the urgency of this
measure in the following terms: "any continuation of the unlawful
and arbitrary detention of the ... applicants would necessarily entail
a serious prolongation of the violation of Article 5 found by the
Court and a breach of the respondent States' obligation under Article
46 § 1 of the Convention to abide by the Court's judgment."5 °
Only two of the four applicants have been released to date. Mr.
Ila~cu was released in May 2001 and Mr. Leco at the expiry of the
sentence imposed on him by the "Supreme Court of the MRT" in
applicants, Mr. Ivantoc and Mr. PetrovJune 2004. 11 The other two
2
custody.1
Popa, are still in
States have to report to the Committee of Ministers of the Council
of Europe on the execution of judgments. 3 During the first
examination of the case before the Committee of Ministers, the
Moldovan authorities considered that, for the time being, their
influence on the separatists was minimal or even non-existent.14 As
regards just satisfaction, the Ministry of Finance had ordered its

47. See generally id. at 232-45 (discussing in depth the arrest, detention, and
conviction of the applicants as well as the events occurring after their convictions
including actions taken to secure their release).
48. Id. at 303-05.
49. Id. at 302.

50. Id.
51. Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Forthcoming Judgments
(June 25, 2004).

52. Ila~eu, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 302.
53. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 32, art. 46(2)
(granting the Committee of Ministers the power to supervise the execution of final
judgments of the Court).

54. Meeting of the Comm. of Ministers, 896th Sess., Notes on the Agenda
(2004).

9
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payment." The Representative of the Russian Federation in the
Committee of Ministers emphasised the Russian authorities'
disagreement with the judgment on both the legal and political levels
and their view that since the applicants' lives were not in danger, the
Convention was not pertinent.5 6 Concerning possible execution
measures or measures already taken, the Russian authorities
considered that they were not in a position to execute the judgment,
since the use of force to release the applicants was out of the
question. 7 Furthermore, the Representative informed the Committee
that he had been instructed not to participate in its examination of the
case until directed otherwise.58 He said that the Court's judgment was
"inconsistent, controversial, subjective, politically and legally wrong
and based on double standards." 9 It should therefore be noted that
the Court's judgment in the lla~cu case has yet to be fully complied
with.6° In the meantime, Russia has paid the just satisfaction sums
awarded by the Court.6
Next I wish to describe the case of Broniowski v. Poland.62 The
Broniowski case concerned the Polish State's continued failure to
implement the applicant's "right to credit" under Polish legislation.
This "right to credit" furnished compensation with respect to
property abandoned by his family at the end of the Second World
War in the territories "beyond the Bug River", as a result of the
change of boundary between the former USSR and Poland.63 The
Broniowski application was chosen as a "pilot case" since at that
time many similar applications were already pending before the

55. See id. 10.
56. See id. 15.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber
Judgement in the Case of Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia (Jul. 8, 2004)
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl 97/view.asp?action=html&documentld=800708&po
rtal=hbkm&source=extemalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF0 1C 116
6DEA398649.
60. Council of Europe Adopts New Resolution in Ilascu Case (March 3, 2006),
http://politicom.moldova.org/stiri/eng/10221/.
61. See id. (noting that the new resolution was an attempt to achieve progress
in releasing the prisoners and thereby adhere to the Court's ruling).
62. Broniowski v. Poland, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
63. Id.
11-12.
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Court.64 The Section relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand
Chamber and adjourned the remaining applications pending the
outcome of the leading case.65
By adopting both the 1985 and 1997 Land Administration Acts,
the Polish State reaffirmed its obligation to compensate the "Bug
River claimants" and to incorporate into domestic law obligations it
had taken upon itself by virtue of international treaties concluded in
1944. 66 However, the Polish authorities, by imposing successive
limitations on the exercise of the applicant's right to compensation,
and by resorting to practices which made it unenforceable in concrete
terms, rendered that right illusory, and destroyed its very essence.6 7
Moreover, the right was extinguished by legislation of December
2003 under which claimants in the applicant's position who had been
awarded partial compensation (2% of the value of the property, in the
applicant's case) lost their entitlement to additional compensation,
whereas those who had never received any compensation were
awarded an amount representing 15% of their entitlement. 68 This
obviously raised an issue of discrimination.69 In the light of these
considerations, the European Court concluded that the applicant "had
to bear a disproportionate and excessive burden which cannot be
justified in terms of the legitimate general community interest
'
pursued by the authorities. "70
The Court was informed that there were roughly 80,000 potential
applicants with analogous claims.71 It concluded in the operative
provisions of the judgment that the violation found had
originated in a systemic problem connected with the
malfunctioning of domestic legislation and practice caused by
the failure to set up an effective mechanism to implement the
"right to credit" of Bug River claimants; .. .the respondent
State must, through appropriate legal measures and
administrative practices, secure the implementation of the

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. 5.
Id.
Id. 162.
Id. 173.
Id. 186.
Id. 110.
Id. 187.
Id. 193.
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property right in question in respect of the remaining Bug
River claimants or provide them with equivalent redress in
lieu, in accordance with the principles of protection of
property rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.72
The Court reiterated that the violation of Article 1 of Protocol
No.1 had originated in a widespread problem which resulted from
deficiencies in the domestic legal order which affected a large
number of people, and which might give rise in future to numerous,
subsequent well-founded applications.73 It decided to indicate the
measures that the Polish State should take, under the supervision of
the Committee of Ministers, and in accordance with the subsidiary
character of the Convention, so as to avoid a large number of
additional cases being referred to it.74 It also decided that all similar
applications-including future applications-should be adjourned
pending the outcome of the leading case and the adoption of
measures at the national level.75 This is the first time that the Court
has ruled in the operative provisions of a judgment on the general
measures that a respondent State should take to remedy a systemic
76
defect at the origin of the violation found.

IV. HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM
Allow me now to briefly address the topical question of human
rights and terrorism. Let me say first of all that I hope that it will have
been obvious from what I have said that human rights law does not
operate in a vacuum, but in a given context. It is an integral part of
democratic society and a threat to that society will impact the way in
which it is applied. The majority of the rights set out in the Convention
are not absolute in that they may be curtailed in the wider interest of
the community, to the extent strictly necessary and provided that this
does not impose an excessive and disproportionate burden on
individuals or a sector of the population. This could be formulated the
other way round, that is that the individual exercising his civil liberties
cannot be allowed to impose a disproportionate burden on the
72. Id. 200.
73. Id. 189.
74. Id. 190.

75. Id. 5.
76. Id.

193.

2007]

THE PAST, THE PRESENT, THE FUTURE

535

community. So essentially the Convention guarantees are applied in a
context defined by the democratic society in which they function. This
is just common sense. Human rights cannot be and should not be
divorced from the practical day-to-day functioning of society.
The Strasbourg Court has consistently recognised the particular
difficulties which combating terrorism creates for democratic
societies.77 It has accepted that the use of confidential information is
essential in combating terrorist violence and the threat that organised
terrorism poses to the lives of citizens and democratic society.78 This
does not mean however that the investigating authorities should be
given carte blanche under Article 5 of the Convention to arrest
suspects for questioning free from effective control by the domestic
courts or by the Convention supervisory mechanism. 79 Again, in the
context of Article 5 of the Convention, "the Contracting States cannot
be asked to establish the reasonableness of the suspicion grounding the
arrest of a suspected terrorist by disclosing the confidential sources of
supporting information or even facts which would be susceptible of
indicating such sources or their identity". 80 But the exigencies of the
situation cannot justify stretching the notion of reasonableness to the
point where the essence of the safeguard secured by Article 5, Section
1 (c) (requiring among other things "reasonable suspicion" of having
committed an offence) is impaired.8'
Democratic society acting in full conformity with the Convention is
therefore not defenceless in the face of terrorism. It would run counter
to the fundamental object and purpose of the Convention, for national
authorities to be prevented from making a proportionate response to
such threats in the interests of the safety of the community as a whole.
In saying this, one should never forget that the insidious
undermining of fundamental rights is one of the dangers of terrorism.
Limitations which may be possible within the margin of appreciation
granted under the Convention must not be so broad as to impair the

77. Chadhal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 79.
78. Id. 131.
79. See id.; see also Murray v. United Kingdom, 300 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1,
27 (1996).
80. Fox, Campbell & Hartley v. United Kingdom, 182 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1,
17(1990).
81. See id. at 16-18.
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very essence of the right in question; they must, in Strasbourg terms,
also pursue a legitimate aim and bear a reasonable relationship of
proportionality between the means employed and the aims sought to be
achieved.8 2 One question that needs to be asked in connection with
exceptional measures taken to combat terrorism is whether there are
techniques that can be employed which both accommodate legitimate
security concerns and yet accord the individual a substantial measure
of procedural justice.83 Nor should it be possible for the national
authorities to free themselves from effective control by the domestic
courts, or ultimately international jurisdiction, simply by asserting
that national security and terrorism are involved. At the same time
"the Convention should not be applied in such a manner as to put
disproportionate difficulties in the way of the police authorities of the
Contracting States in taking effective measures to counter organised
terrorism."84
There are moreover Convention rights which are absolute in
nature and in respect of which no derogation is possible under
Article 15 of the Convention." Thus Article 3 prohibiting torture and
inhuman or degrading treatment enshrines one of the most
fundamental values of democratic society.86 While the Strasbourg
Court is well aware of the immense difficulties faced by States in
protecting their communities from terrorist violence, even in these
circumstances the Convention prohibits torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. Where substantial grounds have
been shown for believing that an individual would face a real risk of
being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 if removed to a
particular receiving State, the responsibility of the Contracting State
to safeguard him or her against such treatment may be engaged in the
event of expulsion.
Let me turn to two other courts for a moment. In rendering his
court's decision of September 1999 that physical interrogation
82. See generally Chadhal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R.
135,
136.
83. See, e.g., id. 131 (illustrating that there are ways to both accommodate
concerns about the security of intelligence information and give the individual
procedural justice).
84. Fox, Campbell & Hartley, 182 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A.) at 17.
85. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 13, art. 15.
86. Id. art. 3.
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techniques were unlawful even in ticking-bomb situations, Justice
Aharon Barak, the President of the Israeli Supreme Court, said this:
We are aware that this decision does not ease dealing with
[the harsh] reality. This is the destiny of democracy, as not all
means are acceptable to it, and not all practices are open to it.
Although a democracy must often fight with one hand tied
behind its back, it nonetheless has the upper hand. Preserving
the rule of law and recognition of an individual's liberty
constitutes an important component in its understanding of
security. At the end of the day they strengthen its spirit and
strength and allow it to overcome its difficulties.8 7
Given the particular context existing in Israel, at the time and
unfortunately still today, his words carry special weight.
In the same vein, Judge Anand, former Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of India, when confronted with the deaths and torture
of alleged terrorists in police custody, had this to say:
[The] challenge of terrorism must be met with innovative
ideas and approach. State terrorism is no answer to combat
terrorism. State terrorism would only provide legitimacy to
'terrorism'. That would be bad for the State, the community
and above all for the rule of law. The State must, therefore,
ensure that various agencies deployed by it for combating
terrorism act within the bounds of law and not become law
unto themselves.8 8

CONCLUSION
So my conclusion is that human rights are not anti-democratic;
terrorism is anti-democratic; arbitrary interference with individual
rights and freedoms is anti-democratic; democracy without the rule
of law is anti-democratic as is, self-evidently, the rule of law without
democracy. In their wisdom the authors of the European Convention
on Human Rights over fifty-five years ago constructed a framework
for the effective operation of democracy and the rule of law based on
minimum standards that are now in principle shared throughout
87. HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 37,
http://www.hamoked.org.il/items/260-eng.pdf.
88. Shri D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) 1 S.C.C. 416, 418.
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forty-six European States. That framework, evolving as it has done
through the Strasbourg case-law, remains as relevant today as it was
then. It still represents a more long-term but ultimately more
effective means of protecting democracy than short-term,
disproportionately repressive measures which may purport to do the
same, but which in the end court the risk of undermining the
foundations of democratic society. In the Klass case in 1978, the
Court warned against the danger of undermining or even destroying
democracy on the ground of defending it.89 That is a warning that we
would all do well to keep in sight, if we wish to preserve a living
democracy, one which is neither under-protected nor over-protected.

89. Klass v. Germany, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1, 23 (1978).

